An Assessment of the Draft Resettlement Plan and other Safeguard Preparations of the Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (ICWRMIP): Project Loan Number: 37049 INO

What the Asian Development Bank’s Board of Directors Should Know Before Deciding on the Program on December 4, 2008.

Submitted by

Aliansi Rakyat untuk Citarum (ARUM)/ Peoples Alliance for Citarum

KRuHA (People’s Coalition for Right to Water)

Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW)-Indonesia;

debtwatch Indonesia

In cooperation with the Bank Information Center

November 2008

ACRONYMS

AP : Affected Person

AH : Affected Household

IPSA : Initial Poverty and Social Assessment

RP : Restlement Plan

ICWRMIP : Integrated Citarum Water Resource Management Investment Program

IWRM : Integrated Water Resources Management

PCP : Public Communication Policy

IR : Involuntary Resettlement

RRP : Report and Recommendation to the President

PJT II : Perum Jasa Tirta II (Jasa Tirta Public Corporation II)

PAM or PDAM: Public Water Supply Company


Table of Contents

Executive Summary

4

I. Overview

7

II. IWRM in ICWRMIP: Demystifying the concept and strategy

11

III. Analysis of ADB’s ICWRMIP-Project 1 Resettlement Plan

18

IV. Transparency and consultation practices

26

V. Anti-corruption strategy

29

VI. Gender strategy

31

VII. Conclusion

34

VIII. Key message

36


Executive Summary

The Aliansi Rakyat untuk Citarum (ARUM) or Peoples Alliance for Citarum, a growing network of Jakarta-based and West Java civil society organizations, has been monitoring the project preparation of ICWRMIP since February 2008. It has since engaged with the project management and the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) as part of its efforts to be kept informed about the planning of ICWRMIP.

ARUM has conducted a collective assessment on ICWRMIP based on fact finding missions, meetings with the ADB project management team, project document review, study of relevant materials including the applicable ADB policies. The purpose of the assessment is to identify the likely impacts of the ICWRMIP, particularly the Phase 1 projects, on the well-being of those directly and indirectly impacted people.

The joint critique identifies the gaps in the draft Resettlement Plan based on ADB’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy. It also examines the soundness of integrated water resource management (IWRM), gender strategy and anti-corruption strategies of the ICWRMIP and the risks involved.

The team that conducted this assessment[1] represented ARUM members and support groups that have been working on Citarum river basin communities and have spent over 10-months monitoring the project preparation via the headquarters and country mission of the ADB, BAPPENAS, and in the project site, especially in the three districts of Kabupaten Karawang, Kabupaten Bekasi and Kota Bekasi whose communities are identified to be impacted by the West Tarum Canal rehabilitation, which is part of ICWRMIP’s Phase 1 projects.

Key findings of this assessment are outlined below:

On the draft Resettlement Plan

· The estimated number of project affected peoples (resettled and host) is inadequate.

· It does not have clear mechanism to address land scarcity and land acquisition issues.

· There are no proper compensation, livelihood restoration and rehabilitation assistance measures.

· It does not guarantee livelihood restoration to the affected people given the gaps in the assistance measures. The social preparation strategy is unclear and unacceptable.

· The resettlement processes have not been clear and participatory.

· The livelihood restoration program does not provide sufficient mechanism and assurance to meet the project objective.

· There is a wide gulf between the Project objective (which is to fill-in any gaps in what local laws and regulations cannot provide in order to help ensure that AHs are able to rehabilitate themselves to at least their pre-project condition)[2] and the design of the Livelihood Restoration Program. The LRP does not appear to provide a guarantee affected persons will not be worse off when they have been resettled. given that the relocation site is unknown and the training programs are based on assumptions.

· Overall, the LRP is very patchy, sketchy, not comprehensive, and vague. It doesn’t have explicit objective and plan to improve or at least to restore their productive hood, including for the affected farmers who might not find their right for land-use.

On transparency and consultation practices

· There have been inadequate public information disclosure and consultations especially to the affected families and local governments.

On gender, anti-corruption and IWRM strategies

· The resettlement plan has no clear and sound gender strategy vis-à-vis ADB’s gender policy. The draft resettlement plan fails to address the mechanisms that oblige every project team leader and project counsel to address critical components of gender and development issues. If the project would continue without in-depth assessment of the differential needs and impacts of the project to women and regardless of the gender policy and IPSA, it could mean that rather than promoting sustainability, this project could further impoverishment risks to women who live at the embankment.

· Anti-corruption framework and how it will be operationalized are not in place. It does not have clear mechanism to prevent and combat corrupt practices in the project management at the local and national levels.

· It has no empirical evidence that demonstrates any successful IWRM projects in Indonesia or in SEA. Yet, it is pushing for this strategy without paying attention to the issue of transaction costs of allocation such that it is not inclusive of different parties from the upper and downstream (having their differential power and competing claims in water allocation and resources) in the project management and decision making. In Indonesia, there have been recent controversies surrounding the creation of a river basin water board whose mandate cuts across the municipal and provincial boundaries, because some local governments refuse to have their authority in river management (inc. charging and collecting user fees) delegated to a river basin board as this will affect their local revenues. The ICWRMIP has no clear strategy how to address such vertical and horizontal conflicts over Citarum river management.

· The rehabilitation of West Tarum Canal project fails to address the growing problems of farmers’ declining access to Citarum water to irrigate their rice fields due to significant increase of water allocated for industrial and drinking consumptions.

The draft resettlement plan of the Phase 1 projects suffers from serious flaws. It does not have sound and clear mechanisms that ensure compliance with the IR Policy at the design and implementation stages. The lack of explicit, verifiable, monitorable, and workable gender, anti-corruption and integrated water management strategies pose serious risks in terms of sparking or reinforcing vertical and horizontal conflicts in the project area. The resettlement plan and other safeguard preparation activities in the Project 1 have no strong guarantee that directly affected people will be safeguarded. Risks to further impoverishment are high. Also, what is more critical and necessary for the sustainability of ensuring water supply and equitable water allocation is the “rehabilitation” of the upstream Citarum and integrative planning and decision making that encompass the upstream and downstream stakeholders and communities, not the rehabilitation of West Tarum Canal.

Since ICWRMIP has no strong and broad community and stakeholder support and given that the high impoverishment and political risks outweigh the potential benefits (which remain unclear), at the maximum, the ADB Board should seriously consider pulling out from investing into the whole MFF-ICWRMIP unless a significant, meaningful and strongly and broadly supported re-assessment of the entire program is undertaken. If the Board proceeds with approving the whole MFF-ICWRMIP without such reassessment, it is a validation that they put legitimacy to the Program that clearly and seriously violates ADB’s safeguard policies and all relevant policies and operating procedures. We urgently demand, among others, that the ADB Board should immediately postpone the approval of the MFF-ICWRMIP and the Phase 1 projects on December 4, 2008 until significant improvements in the project and corrective measures that comply with the bank’s policies, best practices and international standards are in place. Critical project documents should be disclosed and subjected to informed, inclusive and multi-stakeholder consultations, to the direct and indirect people.

A more critical task now is not about the infusion of money but it is about ensuring proper, accountable and participatory governance of Citarum river water resources. We believe that this proposed program might result in incurring bad debt, burdening people with loans that do not help ensure their sustained access to Citarum river management resources. ICWRMIP is an initiative designed largely by technocrats that may obstruct local governments and people’s initiatives in managing their common resources.


I. Overview of Citarum river basin and the ICWRMIP

The Citarum River is one of the most critical river basins in Indonesia. Located in the province of West Java, the basin extends up to 13,000 square kilometers, which provides home and life to 10 million people[3]. It supplies 80 percent of metropolitan Jakarta’s water needs, irrigates over 240,000 hectares of rice and other agricultural crops, and is the source of 1,400 MW of hydroelectric power.

Citarum’s multi-productive functions, indeed, are essential to urban and industrial development as well as rural communities and agricultural activities. However, several researches, including those commissioned by World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI),[4] reveal that the development potential and sustainability of Citarum river has been constrained by: inadequate institutional arrangements, deteriorating infrastructure, competing water demands, and rapid urban and industrial growth, which result shortage in water supply and unhealthy environmental conditions throughout the upper and lower basin.

Such challenges to Citarum’s capacity to provide sustained water supply and to rehabilitate its degraded water systems are complex yet interrelated; and they need to be addressed in a clear, participatory and informed multi-stakeholder process. The ADB has entered the scene, purporting to offer a package of assistance that aims to encompass such a process of restoring Citarum through an investment called Integrated Citarum Water Resource Management Investment Project (ICWRMIP). ICWRMIP uses ADB’s Multi-tranche Financing Facility, [5] which will mark the start of the influx of a new lending instrument that finances not a single project but a program composed of multiple projects, apparently larger in lending volume compared with traditional loans and is programmed for execution between 10-15 years.[6] The Bank has recently entered into an agreement with the Government of Indonesia (GoI) with the former providing loan, technical assistance and grant to prepare and manage ICWRMIP.

Over six hundred million US dollars are being invested for ICWRMIP that comprise of technical assistance, special fund, financing from the Netherlands, ATF Spanish and Cooperation Fund for the Water Sector, GEF and loans from the OCR and ADF. Four TAs have been approved while 3 other TAs are yet to be scheduled for approval. See Table 1 for a summary of financing for ICWRMIP.

Table 1: Tabulated summary of financing for ICWRMIP[7]

ADB Investments for ICWRMIP

Amount

No.

Type/Modality of Assistance

Status

1. TA-4381 INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management

US$1.0 million

Technical Assistance: 37049-01

TA Special Fund

Approved; 26 Aug 2004

2. TA-4381 INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management (Supplementary)

US$275,000

Technical Assistance: 37049-02

TA Special Fund

Approved; 22 Jun 2006

3. TA-4381 INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management (Supplementary)

US$460,000

Technical Assistance: 37049-03

Technical Assistance Special Fund

Approved; 17 Sep 2007

US$250,000

ATF Spanish TA Grant

4. TA-4381 INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Project (Supplementary)

US$200,000

Technical Assistance: 37049-04

Global Environment Facility

Approved; 12 Mar 2008

5. TA (for approval in 2011): Support to Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program – Project 2

US$1.0 million

Technical Assistance: 37049-05

Technical Assistance Special Fund

Proposed; Proposed; approval TBD

6. TA (for approval in 2009): Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program PFR2

US$1.0 million

Technical Assistance: 37049-06

Technical Assistance Special Fund

Proposed; approval TBD

7. TA (for approval in 2008): Institutional Strengthening for Integrated Water Resources Management in the 6 Ci’s River Basin Territory

US$1.0 million

Technical Assistance: 37049-07

Technical Assistance Special Fund

Proposed; to be approved on 04 Dec 2008

US$5.0 million

Netherlands Fund (with LoA)

US$2.0 million

Cooperation Fund for the Water Sector

8. MFF-Facility Concept (for approval in 2008): Multitranche Financing Facility – Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program

US$470.0 million (OCR)

Multi-Tranche Financing Facility: 37049-01

MFF using:

Ordinary Capital Resources

Proposed; to be approved on Dec. 4, 2008

US$30.0 million (ADF)

Asian Development Fund

9. Loan (for approval in 2008): Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program – Project 1

US$20.0 million (OCR)

MFF – Subproject: 37049-02 [Proposed]

MFF using:

Ordinary Capital Resources

Proposed; to be approved on Dec. 4, 2008

US$30.0 million (ADF)

Asian Development Fund

10. Loan (for approval in 2011): Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program – Project 2

US$100.0 million

MFF – Subproject: 37049-03 [Proposed]

MFF using:

Ordinary Capital Resources

Proposed; To be approved in 2011

On December 4, 2008, the ADB’s Board of Directors is slated to give a formal green light for the following projects whose funds constitute the bulk of ICWRMIP financing, namely:

1. TA – Institutional Strengthening for Integrated Water Resources Management in the 6 Ci’s River Basin Territory

2. MFF – Facility Concept: Multitranche Financing Facility – Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program

3. Loan – Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program – Project 1

The loan, Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program – Project 1, will be invested in key areas: (i) institutions and planning for integrated water resource management (IWRM); (ii) water resources development and management (which includes the rehabilitation of West Tarum Canal or WSTC); and (iii) environmental protection. It will also cover supporting Investment Program Management. The expected outcomes are (i) improved reliability of water supply to Jakarta and irrigation areas supplied by West Tarum Canal; (ii) improved water use efficiency and increased yields for rice irrigation in three districts in the Citarum River Basin; (iii) significant increase in the number of community- and NGO-driven initiatives for improved water and catchment management in the Citarum River Basin, and (iv) improved water quality in the waterways and reservoirs of the Citarum River Basin.[8]

The rehabilitation of West Tarum Canal is a critical component of the first phase upon which this assessment was developed. WTC is a 68.3 km long artificial waterway that diverts water from the Citarum River used as a vital source of water for irrigation, industries along the canal and households in Karawang, Bekasi and metropolitan Jakarta. The total loan for this sub-project is US$50 million, which is a slice from the US$500 million program fund or “facility”.

The West Tarum Canal runs through three districts; Kabupaten Karawang, Kabupaten Bekasi and Kota Bekasi whose communities are identified to be involuntarily resettled by the project. The draft Resettlement Plan of WTC rehabilitation project indicates that there will be 872 affected households who will be displaced. In developing the RP, the GoI uses Indonesian law as the legal basis for acquiring properties needed for the project.

According to ADB, the LRP setting in Resettlement Plan was developed to fill the gaps of Indonesian policies with the view of ensuring that affected households are able to rehabilitate themselves to at least their pre-project condition.[9] However, the LRP and Resettlement Plan (which remains draft up to this stage) suffer serious deficits relative to compliance with the ADB’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy and its Handbook. Such deficits are elaborated in this paper.


II. IWRM in ICWRMIP: Demystifying the concept and strategy

Focus of the assessment

· Does ADB have empirical evidence that demonstrates successful IWRM initiatives in Indonesia or in Southeast Asia?

· Does ICWRMIP have clear strategy to address such vertical and horizontal conflicts over Citarum river management arising from the differential power and competing claims of central and local governments, private companies, farmers, women and other poor water users?

· How does the project intend to approach controversies in establishing a water board at river basin level?

· Does the rehabilitation of West Tarum Canal project address the growing problems of farmers’ declining access to Citarum water to irrigate their rice fields due to significant increase of water allocated for industrial and drinking consumptions?

ICWRMIP is being packaged as an embodiment of integrated water resource management (IWRM). The latest fashionable development thinking for managing water resources (since mid-1990s), its most widely cited definition, developed by the Global Water Partnership (2000), refers to IWRM as a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.’[10] IWRM focuses on integrating management of upstream and downstream interests, water quantity and quality, surface and groundwater, and land and water resources.[11]

IWRM is promoted as a departure from traditional water management, which is top-down, supply-led, technology-orientated and sector-driven, that has resulted in unsustainable use of water resources with high environmental, economic and social costs. It calls for the ‘integrated’ management of water usage that coordinates water use between population; water supply; agriculture; industry; energy; navigation; and natural ecosystem. Overall criteria in pursing IWRM objectives are: economic efficiency in water use; public-private partnership; multi-stakeholder involvement in all aspects of decision making process; equity; and environmental and ecological sustainability

In principle, central to IWRM should be participation. The most appropriate scale at which to manage water resources is the sub-basin or tributary level. Basin management requires the establishment of ‘River Basin Organizations’ (RBOs) with decision made by River Basin Committees (RBCs). In theory RBOs are a progressive co-management arrangement in which central-level Government ministries delegate more responsibility to local water users and local authorities to make management decisions regarding the river basins.[12]

Does IWRM work in practice?

It is important not to uncritically accept the IWRM concept. Whilst IWRM sounds great in principle, many think that in practice it is impossible to implement. An international expert argues that:

While at a first glance, the concept of IWRM looks attractive, a deeper analysis brings out many problems, both in concept and implementation, especially for meso-to macro-scale projects. The definition of IWRM continues to be amorphous, and there is no agreement on fundamental issues like what aspects should be integrated, how, by whom, or even if such integration in a wider sense is possible. In the real world, the concept will be exceedingly difficult to be made operational.[13]

There are legitimate issues associated with IWRM. One, some think the definition of IWRM is so general that it allows a business as usual approach where donors and other development actors can claim to be following the newest development thinking (whilst really doing the same as before).

Two, some think the only people to benefit from IWRM are the highly paid consultants working on the idea. It is also developed with techno-centric approach. [14]

Three, many projects purporting to embody the IWRM concept often falls short of integrating water and land management, linking natural territorial river basins with administrative organizations, and more importantly, facilitating public participation in the planning process (Wescoat, 2004).

Four, IWRM has been used by many international financial institutions, including the ADB, to justify their increased investment in water sector, including the IWRM-inspired projects for 25 rivers in Asia. But such push has its underlying agenda: to get the market or the private sector have a greater stake in water management. Ninan and Saravanan found that international agencies financing IWRM projects shape and reshape watershed landscapes to meet their own visions and goals.[15] Schulze revealed how the South African National Water Act-1998 embraces IWRM but emphasised commercialization of agriculture.[16] The same thing also happened in Indonesia, in which the Water Policy is based on IWRM concept, but it only reinforced the water privatization agenda through the loan from the World Bank.

Five, policy setting and implementation has become the basic requirement for IWRM; but it is not easy to do this especially when it is left at the overall discretion or management of the central government.

Six, lopsided coordination is also a common problem that hampers IWRM. Tapela mentioned that these are often attributed to (1) the fast tracking approach of government, (2) inadequate knowledge of the social and environment conditions, (3) lack of synergy among various policies, (4) overlapping institutional jurisdictions and power relations among institutional structures.[17]

Seven, there is not any evidence of successful strategy to cope with the problem of transaction cost[18] in water allocation. Transaction costs are usually associated with organizing the large number of beneficiaries to agree collectively on water allocation.

Eight, there is a big problem of representation of who represent whom and the result is lack of legitimacy especially in involving civil society in the establishment of water board[19]. And the result is an inclusion of civil society which is in-line with the government and market as other members of a water board, and an exclusion of which is against them.

Marketing ICWRMIP as an IWRM model

ICWRMIP is being used as one example of ADB’s IWRM projects in the 25 rivers in Asia-Pacific region.. The rivers of Citarum, Ciliwung-Cisadane, Ciujung, Progo-Opak Oyo, and Bengawan Solo are among those targeted for IWRM in Indonesia[20]. Understandably, these projects are covered by the Water Financing Program of the ADB, which spans from 2006-2010.[21]

West Tarum Canal is an artificial waterway constructed in 1968 to transfer water from Citarum river to irrigate West Java’s agricultural fields, industries and supply potable water to Karawang, Bekasi and Jakarta. WTC originates from Curug village in the sub-district of Teluk Jambe, district of Karawang. It then passes through the district of Bekasi and empties the water at the Water Treatment Plant in Buaran, Kalimalang in East Jakarta.

There are many parties involved in the allocation of water of WTC. At least three PDAM and two private partners of PAM Jakarta (Palyja which is owned by Suez Lyonnaise of France and Aetra); hundreds of industries along the canal; irrigation; hydropower companies, fisheries, and tourism at the upper side of the canal, three municipal governments of Purwakarta, Karawang and Bekasi, two provincial governments of West Java and Jakarta. It is not to mention so many central government departments: the Forestry Department which is responsible for conservation, the Department of Public Works which manages surface water, the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources which is responsible for groundwater management, the Department of Environment for the quality of the water, the Bappenas, the Department of Agriculture and also the Department of Finance. The so many parties with their own vested interests make it difficult to manage WTC.

The Regional Autonomy Law makes the problem more complicated. For example, the Bupati of Purwakarta is trying to push the PJT II to contribute to Purwakarta’s local revenue, just because the Jatiluhur dam where the water of WTC comes from is located at Purwakarta municipality. Many controversies and opposition to the establishment of Citarum River Basin Water Board are also indirectly caused by this law. Municipal and provincial government have a prejudice that this organization is only a way of the central government to take back the authority from the local governments. The opposition of establishing river basin water board is also supported by the Ministry of Home Affair. That is why until today there is not any Presidential Decree on the establishment of river basin water boards.[22]

WTC has been fraught with conflict based not only on regulating water allocation but also on the competing stake of various interest groups such as the multilateral development banks, private companies, farming communities the local and central governments[23] In Hadipuro’s research, “water users face scarce supply during dry seasons. Farmers, in particular, bear more brunt than others as crops yields become far lower for lack of irrigation.’ Risks to livelihood are further threatened as a number of companies siphon considerable volume of water from Citarum for their operations. There is a fact that the irrigation area has been reduced because of this reason and there is a systematic way to convert the irrigation area into housing and industrial area along the canal (see table 2).

Table 2. Irrigation Area in Division I PJT II 2008

NO

Irrigation Area

Existing Irrigation (ha)

Decreasing number (ha)*

Total

(ha)

1

Kabupaten Bekasi

52.301

953

51.348

2

Kota Bekasi

196

3

DKI Jakarta

933

161

772

JUMLAH

53.430

1.114

52.316

* Land conversion from irrigation area into housing and industrial area

In the upstream of Citarum, resource management conflict occurs among local parliament, central government, civil society organizations and MDBs, especially the ADB, in relation to financial burden and the effectiveness of the project.[24] In relation to ICWRMIP, Ichsan explained “the project has been designed from the top and was never brought to us for meaningful and adequate consultation.”

“In designing the WTC rehabilitation project, the local government has never been consulted by the central government. Even if there were consultations, we received no notice; if there were any, it had never come to our attention. It will turn out that the central government will decide how the project is run while the regional and local governments will be relegated to just comply with the central government while being obligated to provide ‘dana pendamping’ or supporting fund. How should we explain to our people about allocating some fund (in contribution to paying the ICWRMIP loan) that is not in our development plan?”[25]

This testimony raises questions, if not attests to failed transparency and deficient consultation with the people’s representatives in the local parliament of West Java as well as how affected people in Purwakarta, Karawang and Bekasi are being kept in the dark about the ICWRMIP. Where are transparency and consultations then in this suppored “integrated” approach to managing Citarum river system? [26]

If coordination is another critical element to make IWRM work, this appears to be not in existence. If it does, it is seen as weak. One government agency, the Department of Public Works, is single-handedly running the coordination during project preparation. Several locals including Asep Warlan Yusuf from Parahyangan University Bandung expressed that “the establishment of a law that governs river management remains a problem as there is still strong ego-sector. The public works department exercises its authority to move the project preparation plan forward but it failed to coordinate and consult with the local governments and their respective offices as the latter also have mandate in terms of managing the Citarum river basin and dealing with the concerns of various stakeholders. This situation can breed more conflict…and is now reigniting long-standing tensions in the basin area. ” And the ADB is mum on this.[27] There is nowhere in the project document that discusses how it plans to address (i.e. avoid or not to reinforce) political conflicts arising from competing claims and interests over Citarum river resource management.

Setiawan W, Head of environment destruction of BPLHD (Badan Pengendali Lingkungan Hidup Daerah/ Local Environment Controller Bureau) also pointed out:

“The local government of West Java has conducted Citarum Bergetar (clean, beautiful, and sustainable) drive which was inclusive of multiple stakeholders. Yet, this initiative might vacillate because it is not recognized in the ICWRMIP, which is being pushed by ADB and the central government. ICWRMIP simply overrides local government efforts.”

He also added that

’Setidaknya ada 40-50 peraturan yang dibuat sejumlah institusi, mulai dari pemerintah pusat, pemerintah provinsi, serta masing-masing pemerintah kabupaten dan kota. Keadaan ini amat menyulitkan dalam pelaksanaan pengelolaannya di lapangan.’[28]

’At least, there are 40-50 regulations made by several institutions, starting from central government, provincial level government, and also from every local (district) government. These overlapping, often incongruent policies are likely going to make project execution exceedingly difficult.’[29]

The issues raise above show that there are no promising efforts that will make WTC, in particular, and the implementation of ICWRIP in general, achieve the critical requirements of an IWRM.

ICWRMIP also does not address the long running conflicts surrounding the allocation and water use from Citarum. In the project monitoring and design framework,[30] it mentions that one of the outputs expected from the ICWRMIP project is the increasing of water use efficiency, with the decreasing as much as 45% of water use for irrigation as the indicator. It can be seen, however, that ICWRMIP puts more emphasis to water as a commodity, not a common resource. It means that 45% of the water used from Citarum could be commodified for use by the industrial companies and households given its high economic value (see table 3). The implication of this water commodification is that it will bring a revenue increase of the PJT II which has a powerful stake in Citarum river water (see tables 4 and 5).

Table 3. Water Supply and Usage Trend 1990-2025

No

Details

1990

2005

2025

M3/sec

Million m3

M3/sec

Million m3

M3/sec

Million m3

1

Sources

Citarum plus Its Dam

Other rivers

182,33

60.25

5,750.00

1,900.00

182.33

61.83

5,750.00

1,950.00

182,33

63.42

5,750.00

2,000.00

2

Usages

Irrigation

Industries

Water Supply

Fisheries

Municipalities

Peak Electricity

177.30

7.91

9.77

1.00

2.00

9.51

5,591.00

249.45

308.11

31.54

63.07

300.00

175.00

15.00

21.30

10.00

10.00

3.17

5,518.80

473.04

671.72

315.36

315.36

100.00

168.00

25.00

45.00

20.00

15.00

0.00

5,298.05

788.41

1,419.12

630.72

473.04

0.00

3

Water Balance

Source

Usage

Surplus/deficit

242.58

207.49

35.09

7,650.00

6,543.88

1,106.12

244.16

234.47

9.69

7,700.00

7,394.28

305.72

245.75

273.00

(27.25)

7,750.00

8,609.33

(859.33)

Table 4. Water Charges for Each User and Its Contribution to PJT II Revenue

Table 5 The Projected Revenue of PJT II


III. Analysis of ADB’s ICWRMIP-Project 1 Resettlement Plan[31]

Focus of this assessment:

· Is there an adequate estimation of the number of project affected peoples (resettled and host)?

· How are land scarcity and land acquisition issues addressed?

· Is there a proper compensation, livelihood restoration and rehabilitation assistance?

· Does it guarantee livelihood restoration and are there gaps in the assistance measures

· Are the resettlement processes clear and participatory? Is the social preparation acceptable?

1. Flawed and inconsistent use of terms that refer to project affectees can lead to significant underestimation of people entitled to receive compensation, adequate livelihood restoration support, and economic justice.

The draft RP adopts the term affected households (AH) instead of the standard use of affected persons (APs) to calculate the number of those affected by the project. The ADB’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy and its Handbook on Resettlement define those people affected by project-related changes in use of land, water or other natural resources as “affected persons”[32]. The use of “affected households” is misleading as it does not represent a realistic estimate or counting of those APs, both direct and indirect affectees. The AH figures can be the ground for significant miscalculation of APs. By counting “households” and not “persons”, there is strong probability that the number of people affected could be four or five times larger than the number identified in the draft RP. In rural Indonesia, a household typically consists of 4-5 members.

The draft RP had identified 872 AHs that will be relocated.[33] Assuming the average number of every rural Inonesian household is 5, the number of affected persons can reach up to 4.360 APs. By failing to identify the exact number of people that will be affected this project, calculations for entitlements may also be flawed.

Also, there is benchmark upon which other are excluded from the list of APs. There is also no explicit statement how many people will be directly impacted and the benchmark for determining the indirect impacts they will experience.

Affected persons who are not counted are likely to be left out in receiving proper compensation for their lost and damaged properties as well as their entitlements to restore their income sources and livelihood activities. Those people left out can fall further to the quagmire of joblessness, landlessness and food insecurity. Risks of impoverishment can be higher and there is no guarantee that there their economic situation will be better or at least the same as before their relocation.[34]

2. Relocation plan is not available.

2.1. No clear Information regarding the relocation site. How many, when, how affected persons are to be relocated and what can they expect once they are moved are not disclosed.

The ADB Handbook on Resettlement states: “Location and quality of the new relocation site(s) are critical factors in relocation planning because they ultimately determine access to land, social support networks, employment, business, credit, and market opportunities.”[35] The whole draft RP does not contain any clear information where the affected persons will be relocated. In the relocation section, it only says: “Based on meetings with the local government, it has been confirmed that there are available private land available within the village as replacement land for residential and commercial purposes[36].

Where are those lands?

The non-existence of information on relocation site is a clear indication that there is no sound and acceptable Livelihood Restoration Program (LRP) and this is an indicator of non-compliance with the Involuntary Resettlement policy. Te absence of clear reslocation site and plan means that the affected people who will be displaced are unable to predict or to assure their livelihood afterwards.

The Handbook also underscores that site selection should be part of the Feasibility Study.[37] In this case, how can one do a feasibility study when the relocation site is not clear, and the department in charge of commissioning the RP (Directorate General of Water resources, Ministry of Public Works) only heard about possibility of location site without even inspecting it?

Moreover, the information of relocation site itself was only based on information by local government and it is unclear which local government had confirmed this: the provincial government or the district governments? Which district? More problematic is the fact that the possible relocation site is “an available private land available within the village”. This most likely will lead to violation of people’s right to land access, as will be elaborated in more detail below.

2.2. Flawed consultation on resettlement and non-transparent information

The handbook cited “site selection and relocation plans must be based on, and tested through community consultation. The APs and their hosts should be allowed to participate in decisions concerning site selection, layout and design, and site development.”[38]

In the Appendix 5 of the draft RP, [39] which shows the list and details of consultation meetings, there is no record of any discussion about relocation site. There is also no record of discussion how and when the affected people will be relocated. Thus, the consultation meetings can be considered as misleading or even deceiving as it did not discuss at all these relocation issues in substance – largely because there appears to be no relocation plan.

Unclear relocation site is a gross transparency deficit. Why should the affected people be left guessing where, when and how they are going to be relocated? They have a right to choose and decide the location of their new home. Consultation meetings are supposed to inform and discuss with the affected people to take feedback from them who would be sent away from their current homes. In preparing the resettlement, it appeared that socialization, not consultation, was what ADB adopted when they encountered selected project affectees.

2.3. Depriving people’s right to access and use land?

Unclear relocation site and moving the APs to an available private land, can be seen as a machination of denying tpeoples right to know their land entitlement and how to use it. There is no guarantee that the APs will find a favorable place to live and work, given the scarcity of land in West Java. The APs might end up being less well off, more impoverished than before the project. From the 872 AHs expected to be relocated, 209 are farmers[40]. Given the uncertainty of the relocation site, these farmers affected by the project might not find a productive agricultural land.

Furthermore, if the affected people were moved to a private land, their right to access land can be deprived. There is no feasibility study on the relocation site that was conducted by the responsible central and local authorities, representatives of community organizations and NGOs. The identified or proposed private land as relocation site is unclear, which poses major risks including:

· No guarantee that the private landowner would not sell his land to another party

· The affected people may not have sufficient financial capacity to purchase the land

· It is unlikely that the people can build permanent houses.

Overall, unclear relocation site certainly does not comply with the Involuntary Resettlement Policy and the Handbook on Resettlement of the ADB.

3. No sound and clear income/livelihood restoration program

ADB’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy underscores the importance of income and livelihood restoration program in the Resettlement Plan to ensure that people who are to be resettled are provided with sufficient resources and opportunities to re-establish their homes and livelihoods as soon as possible.[41]

In the Handbook on Resettlement, a schematic, step-by-step guide in identifying and devloping income and livelihood restoration program is presented. The guide specifically informs the ADB and Implementing agency in assessing prospects of (continued) employment in the project area, the types of income-generating activities available at the relocation site, how many people can be absorbed, and what training or competencies are needed, among others.

3.1. Livelihood restoration program is not concrete

The livelihood restoration program, however, suffers a major loophole as it does not clearly identify and describe the relocation site. The Board is about to give a green light to the whole ICWRMIP, including the Project 1 but it nowhere in the project documents that are publicly available is the relocation site, whether the it provide better opportunities or conducive environment to start a new life, if there are better alternatives to relocation site, or if it is more economically feasible not to relocated the affected people.

Further, the trainings and other ‘livelihood activities’ identified in the LRP do no adequately explain why they are needed considering the absence of in-depth profiling of the relocation site. Yes, training and providing livelihood activities are important in preparing the affected people with the necessary competencies and means to rebuilding their economic well-being; but those identified in the draft RP do not justify if these are economically feasible and culturally appropriate. The ADB and the implementing agency appear to be engaged in guesswork, which was based on a 2-3 hours socialization or focus group discussion with only a few affected households (and not affected persons). The draft RP cited a a survey where the respondents were questioned whether they wish to change their profession. Eighty-three percent (83%) of the 872 respondents said NO. Is it not too telling that affected people hardly see a future outside or away from their present homestead and present farmland?[42]

4. Entitlement analysis is inadequate and flawed. It does not fully represent real social condition of the affected people.

In ADB’s Handbook on Resettlement, entitlement is defined as a range of measures comprising compensation, income restoration, transfer assistance, income substitution, and relocation which are due to affected people, depending on the nature of their losses, to restore their economic and social base.[43]

The manner in which the draft of Resettlement Planning of this project deals with the entitlement component raises deep concerns.

4.1 The draft RP does not protect and fails to provide comprehensive support to affected people who are without legal land title

The draft Resettlement Plan mentions that the entitlement implementation arrangements[44] will be based on both the entitlement matrix and existing local government regulations, to wit:

  1. APs within the Karawang district and Bekasi City will be entitled to replacement cost as described in the entitlement matrix and calculated based local regulations where available.
  2. APs within the Bekasi District will be entitled to compensation using the uang kerohiman scheme as stipulated in the existing local government regulation Keputusan Bupati Bekasi Nomor 300/Kep.71-POD. I/2007 or any updated local government regulation.

These entitlement arrangements are loose and non-binding. They could lead to varying and competing land entitlement claims of the Affected Persons, even the indirectly affected ones. These are inherently subjective, not objective as there is no clear standard in determining what Affected Persons are entitled to. This could also mean that whoever is in-charge of implementing these arrangements, this can be open to abuse. If there is money involved, this can open doors for shady practices.

For the information of ADB, uang kerohiman in Bekasi District is merely treated as a form of charity. Based on Indonesia’s experience, the term uang kerohiman could also lead to the corrupt practices. One case is that of a toll highway project in North Jakarta where the State’s use of uang kerohiman resulted to unjustified and forcible relocation of people away from their land. Uang kerohiman spared Jakarta residents with KTP (formal legal land title) while who those who don’t have a title were made to leave their homestead without their consent.[45]

The draft Resettlement Plan also states that All households found within the Project area are considered squatter (emphasis added)s’.[46] The concept of ‘squatters’ is often taken as ‘unlawful residents’ in Indonesia on the basis of having no land use rights or legal ownership of the land they occupy. The draft Resettlement Plan defines a squatter as a person who has no legal title to land but illegally occupies and squats upon public land.[47]

The people identified as affected people (or AHs) have no legal title to the land (embankment) where they live and farm. The draft RP treats these people as squatters. This can mean that having no land title will be a bar to compensation. There is no explicit provision in the draft RP either that guarantees protection and proper entitlements to the affected people. This is a stark contradiction with the basic principle noted in ADB’s Handbook on Resettlement and Operation Manual of Involuntary Resettlement:

No formal title. Indigenous groups, ethnic minorities, pastoralists, people who claim for such land without formal legal rights, and others, who may have usufruct or customary rights to affected land or other resources, often have no formal legal title to their lands. The absence of a formal legal title to land is not a bar to ADB policy entitlements.’[48]

It also fails see the affected people as humans who supposedly the central subject of development and active participants and beneficiaries of the right to development.[49] This project is going to deprive persons’ rights on their rights to decide on what kind development is needed for their well being.

Moreover, it is important to note Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights 9 July 2008 report that there are 15 cases of involuntary resettlement that consist of violation of human rights, and two of them resulted from the rehabilitation of canal and ‘normalization’ (diversion of waterways) of the river. Said report mentions that while some of them some only received Rp. 250.000 per household, others, if not most affected people, did not or were having difficulties getting compensation largely due to lack of land ownership title, failure to provide sufficient evidence of documents to prove their land use rights, subjective application of uang kerohiman, and other factors[50]

There are also several cases of involuntary resettlement in Indonesia where military or para-military forces were used by the government and the private companies, respectively, that resulted to human rights violations.[51] Many people lost their bargaining position to defend their own rights to lands and their livelihood due to the employment of force.

We do not see any strong mechanism in the resettlement plan that can safeguard affected people’s rights to land and to defend their livelihood given the high risks and the in the serious flaws both in the substantive and process of developing the resettlement plan.

4.2 Problems in determining the affected assets of the affected households

There are several assets noted in the draft resettlement plan (particularly Table 5.1) that will be covered by entitlements.[52] It is unclear, however, whether this document has also made proper calculation of structures to be compensated in other districts where there are affected persons. The exact number of affected assets (damaged or lost) by affected persons is also unclear.

4.3 Gaps in the compensation design

As mentioned earlier, the draft resettlement plan indicates the entitlement implementation arrangements[53] will be based on both the entitlement matrix and existing local government regulations.

However, a statement was given by Indonesia National Planning Bureau at a meeting held in July 2008 stressing that the compensation will be managed by the local government. It raises concern about the structure in which the people to be resettled will be getting a proper and a fair compensation.[54] Such a statement gives no clarity how and to what extent ADB will have an oversight in the implementation of the resettlement plan based on IR Policy and on implementing and monitoring. How can a local government ensure that in applying uang kerohiman, affected people will be fairly and properly compensated?

The compensation design also fails to present and address risks involve often associated with availing of and providing proper compensation. In the context of Indonesia, these risks often involve intimidation and conflicts, among others.

4.3.1 Intimidation

The draft RP does not seriously integrate intimidation as a major and a long running risk in light of the use of force and several forms of interventions to influence or pressure people to accept or live with a compensation. As mentioned earlier, violation of human rights recur in forced relocation or development-induced resettlement cases. As earlier noted, a number of cases about involuntary resettlement process in Indonesia involved or tended to employ military or para-military forces to force people to relocate or leave their homes.[55] Feeling powerless in defending themselves from these armed groups, many people have lost their bargaining position to safeguard their right to land and to defend their livelihood. In some cases, communities who are organized in articulating their common demands (supported by urban groups) often end up being labeled as communists, a psychological warfare and scare tactic used during the Soeharto time (and until now) to contain organized opposition to displacements despite legal grounds and legitimate causes. This form of intimidation happened in the case of communities opposing the Dam Jatigede.[56]

What this section indicates is that there have been some misuses of power and abuses of basic human rights when involuntary resettlement occur. Failing to recognize intimidation and how to concretely address it during project implementation poses risks of not just further impoverishment but also trauma for relocated family and for those who do not want to be relocated.

4.3.2 Potential to spark or perpetuate conflicts

The draft RP document has also failed to see the horizontal and vertical conflicts that lay siege to big development projects

The non existence of further explanation on how the ‘872 Affected Household’ been chosen could lead to the similar conflict. Every household has varying number of house members. Since the design is inadequate to explain how the member will be relocated, this would potentially trigger the envy between people. This kind of situation frequently happens in resettlement cases in Indonesia.

One example the involuntary resettlement in Teluk Gong in the year 2002 when there was a clean up operation in the West Tarum Canal including relocation of families away from the embankment where they live. Although every household received the compensation without any benchmark and scope of what is covered by the compensation and in what systematic way such compensation was to be delivered.[57] As a result relocated families had several encounters with the village and local government officials citing issues of unfair and subjective compensation, favoritism, crrupt practices, among others.

4. 4. Capacity of Project Implementing Unit (PIU) is questionable

The draft resettlement plan outlines the creation of Project Implementing Unit, which will be integrated in the Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai (BBWS) under the Ministry of Public Works. With one senior staff and three assistants who will represent each Resettlement Working Group (RWG) in each district, the PIU is expected to perform crucial roles and responsibilities, to wit: [58]

  1. Carry out the necessary surveys and field investigation needed in the updating of the RP;
  2. Carry out consultation-meetings with the AHs, including the distribution of the PIB/disclosure of the draft and final updated RP;
  3. Review and approve the results of the replacement cost survey;
  4. Plan restoration of land to its pre-project condition to ensure that AHs will be allowed to use affected land after it has been assessed for any contamination and certified as safe for use;
  5. Prepare relocation plan during RP updating. Activities include, facilitate in finding replacement plots for residential for all relocating AHs within or nearby villages with affordable and renewable lease or lease-to-buy agreement, with similar or better conditions as before, with latrine. For affected shops, facilitate to find suitable place/plot to lease/rent (existing/new markets) within/nearby villages, with a provision to renew. Ensure that no AHs will be displaced until suitable sites have been found and that updated RP has been approved by ADB;
  6. Provide special attention to poor and vulnerable AHs through consultation and ensure that their concerns and special needs are addressed during RP updating and implementation;
  7. Together with the PIC and NGO, design and implement the restoration and livelihood restoration program, and monitor said activities and provide modifications in the program to improve implementation as and when necessary;
  8. Prepare the necessary vouchers and other documentation to facilitate the expeditious processing of the compensation of the AHs and deliver compensation payment to the AHs;
  9. Receive complaints, verbal or written, from the AHs and ensure that these are brought to the attention of the Bupati or Walikota for appropriate action;
  10. Maintain a record of all public meetings, complaints, and actions taken to address complaints and grievances at the District/City level; and
  11. Submit quarterly progress reports on RP updating and implementation (payment, relocation, income restoration) to the Balai Besar.

Question to ADB: does the PIU have the capacity to deliver such roles given that it has scare to zero demonstrable experience in effectively executing resettlement plans under ADB-financed projects?

IV. Transparency and consultation practices

Focus of the assessment

· Have there been adequate public information disclosure, consultation and independent grievance mechanism?

· How inclusive and clear the PM & E framework of the project at the local and national levels?

ADB’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy states:

The objectives of the Bank’s policy on involuntary resettlement should be to (i) avoid involuntary resettlement wherever feasible; and (ii) minimize resettlement where population displacement is unavoidable, and ensure that displaced people receive assistance, preferably under the project, so that they would be at least as well-off as they would have been in the absence of the project…[59]

In the draft RP, however, it points at replacing and compensating “lost assets based on the principle of replacement cost that should be in line with local government regulations, if available (emphasis added).’[60]

There are two main problems here. One, what would happen if the government regulations are below the ADB’s standards? Two, ‘if available’ clause shows that there is no clear bound between the ADB and the implementation of this project. The implications that ADB may avoid its accountability ensure that displaced people receive assistance, preferably under the project, so that they would be at least as well-off as they would have been in the absence of the project as mentioned in the Involuntary resettlement Policy of ADB.

1. Dubious consultations and its agenda

Consultation is mechanism to help ensure transparency in project decision making and management. ADB’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy states: “The Affected People should be fully informed and closely consulted on resettlement and compensation options.”

To make it meaningful and in good faith, it would have been desirable if ADB conducted consultations:

· In a desirable context (well intentioned; with clear purpose, scope, sufficient political support and sufficient time; and conducted at all appropriate levels and scales)

· With desirable process (inclusive, informed and deliberative)

· With desirable outcomes (options assessed; rights, risks and responsibilities established; increased understanding; workable agreements)

Did the RP preparation get anywhere closer to these context, process and outcomes?

The draft RP indicates:

“Prior to the commencement of the IOL in September and October 2006 and again in April and May 2007 and May 2008 as part of follow-up activities on data gathering in connection with the preparation of the RP, public meetings and consultations with local officials, residents, and AHs were in villages traversed by the WTC. The agenda in the pre-IOL public meetings included a briefing on the objectives of the proposed rehabilitation of WTC; main activities of the research team (i.e., conduct of socio-economic household survey, IOL, replacement cost study, and public consultations); ADB’s policy on Involuntary Resettlement; and identification of probable positive and adverse impacts of the Project, and recommendations on how to avoid and mitigate said negative impacts.”

The content, participants and the number of attendees are included in the draft RP and the ADB TA 4381-INO: Additional Survey and Consultation to the Affected People in Preparation for Resettlement Plan for the West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation. However, we see several issues arising from the document:

2. ADB held consultations, socialization, and focus group discussions. What’s the difference?

The list of the so-called “Consultation Meetings” in Appendix 5 of the Resettlement Plan includes five types of meetings: consultation; Socialization and Public Meeting; Socialization and Gender Public Meeting; Focus Group Discussions, and RP Working Group Coordination. It is unclear the difference of scope, objectives, and outcome between each category.

Moreover, there is a false interpretation and usage of “consultation” and “socialization” in the RP. The most important Consultation Meetings, which must include the Affected People, only involves Local Government (LG) and Perum Jasa Tirta (PJT – Water Operator)

Some people listed as participants in the meetings are also questionable are questionable (i.e. whether or not they actually attended) since the affixed signatures appear to have the similar stoke, making us question if somebody signed up for them. See figure 1 below:

Figure 1. Some participants in the consultation: Different names with similar stroke in signatures[61]

Different names with similar stroke in signatures?

Different names with similar stroke in signatures?

Different names with similar stroke in signatures?


V. Anti-corruption strategy

Focus of the assessment:

  • Does the project document have clear mechanism to prevent/address corruption?

A critical requisite to ensure project accountability is a sound and workable anti-corruption strategy. A well-developed procurement system is necessary in preventing illicit behavior that could be detrimental in achieving the goal of this project.

ADB defines corruption as “the abuse of public or private office for personal gain.” Its more comprehensive definition states that: Corruption involves behavior on the part of officials in the public and private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed.[62]

However, the draft Resettlement Plan and other available project documents do not mention any anti-corruption strategy in the project and how it will be operationalized. If there is any, we doubt if it makes explicit reference to anti-corruption policy of the ADB that outlines the standards. Also, it does not make reference to Indonesian Keppres (Presidential Decree 80/2003) regarding rules and regulation for public property procurement. It is important for ADB to also include this Presidential Decree as a tool to prevent corruption especially in this project that will involve large fund managed by a government institution. While the ADB anticorruption policy and procedures are limited by local regulation, alignment of public procurement mechanism should also be included.

While the draft RP presents a plan to outsource an NGO service in assisting and monitoring the implementation of the project,[63] clarity about the selection mechanism remains lacking. For us, this lack of clarity on the terms of reference and selection of consultant NGO might endanger the principles of independence and objectivity of NGO in performing their tasks as well as in packaging their report. There is also a likelihood or potential risk that a consultant NGO will be instrumentalized to put a stamp of approval to any project management activities without critically examining compliance with ADB policies.. There is no explicit articulation in project documents (including the draft RP) where an outsourced NGO can do a check-and-balance role while ensuring high-level competency and independence. The draft RP also fails to provide any mechanism that takes a private company (if hired to support the implementation of the resettlement program) to account when it fails to comply with the ADB policies.

It is obvious that the resettlement planning document is ignoring the ADB’s Anti Corruption policy. In addition, there are no clear steps and benchmarks within the document that will be used in bidding, procuring, and consumption of goods and service from a vendor or consultant. In Transparency International-Indonesia’s opinion, a clear and coherent employment of a business sector’s services and/or purchase of goods from a private company or NGO is utterly missing.

Also, neither is there a here is no a clear definition about project information that can be disclosed although there is a policy about disclosure.[64] This lack of definition or categorization can pose risk about the non-disclosure of information about the procurement and mobilization of goods and services in the project. Some of these may be classified as “confidential”, justified based a thinking their disclosure might hurt a larger public interest. perceived for the ‘involve larger public interest.” Dispute settlement mechanism is not also clearly defined within the resettlement plan.


VI. Gender strategy

Focus of the assessment:

· Is there an assessment of the differential impacts of resettlement to women, mean and children?

· Will the resettlement plan ease or create more burdens to women? In what way?

· How is this addressed in the RP?

1..Unclear assessment of the potential differential project impacts to men, women and children

ADB has a gender policy which introduced new institutional mechanisms for increasing and improving ADB’s performance and activities directed at improving the status of women.[65] The draft resettlement plan only provides the number of affected households but has no clear data about differential impacts of the project to men, women, children and the elderly.

The draft RP indicates:[66]

· the distribution of AHs heads by gender (i.e total 91 female versus 781 male);

· the distribution of AHs based on education level in each Region (i.e. 160 with no education, 127 not completed elementary, 294 completed elementary, 2 not completed high school, 92 completed junior high school, 110 completed senior high school, 1 not completed college, 1 finished college, 1 finished university, and 77 not giving their answer); and

· the educational attainment of households (with no answer from 1 female household head and no answer from 98 male house heads)

This data means nothing unless there is clarity in the draft RP how it will treat members of the family based on their varying backgrounds, needs and the impacts they will face when project implementation begins. It is also not enough to assess their needs and how to address them without their consent and involvement.

  1. No livelihood options assessment for women

Based on ELAW Indonesia findings[67], there are many places used as cafes for the work of commercial sex workers. These cafes measured approximately 5 square meters in size are located in the area known as ‘Tegal Danas’ in Bekasi and ‘Kobak Biru’ in Karawang. There is no single word in the document that mentions the type of their livelihood/income generated by many women living at the embankment.

When debtWATCH Indonesia conducted a fact-finding mission relative to this project, on October 2008, there was a testimony from one of the women working in the cafe. She said: I have no idea if this area will be relocated because of the canal. The only thing that I ever heard is that they would asphalt the road[68]

It is basic in the IR policy of the ADB that one of the key steps in developing income restoration programs is to analyze economic activities of all APs (by gender, age group, education, skills, income, household size, preference, options) to come up with a clear benchmark and realistic measures in addressing their needs.[69] Furthermore, the finding shows that the draft RP has no clear analysis about the livelihood patterns of women.

We believe that special treatment to all of those women working as the commercial sex workers need to be seen as equally as important as the other analysis. By failing to incorporate this, it serves as an utter disregard of their rights to maintain or keep their livelihood options. For, example , Karawang (being one of the directly affected districts) is one of the sending areas of trafficking in Indonesia.

According to ADB, the gender plan identifies strategies, mechanisms and/or project components for addressing gender concerns, and reports on how women are to be involved in the design, implementation and monitoring process. Budget provision for these components must also be highlighted in the plan. A short summary of the gender plan is included as a core appendix to the RRP, consisting of (i) the preparatory work undertaken to address gender issues in the project; (ii) the special features included in the project design to address gender impacts, to facilitate and encourage women’s involvement and/or ensure tangible benefits to women; (iii) mechanisms to ensure implementation of the gender design elements; and (iv) gender monitoring and evaluation. A gender plan format is provided in Appendix 3 of the document. If there is a project-specific gender plan, the project team leader and project counsel ensure that the loan documents support the implementation and monitoring of the gender plan.[70]

ADB’s gender policy also mentions that an Initial Poverty and Social Assessment (IPSA) is required for all ADB loan projects and programs. Gender analysis must be conducted as an essential component of the IPSA. A gender analysis checklist for the IPSA is provided in Appendix 1. The IPSA is carried out as early as possible in the project cycle, and preferably by the fact-finding stage for the project preparatory technical assistance or other project preparatory study. ADB’s public communications policy also requires the IPSA to be posted on ADB’s website no later than 14 calendar days following the date of completion.

The fact is, up to now, IPSA has not been disclosed to public.

IPSA indicates that if the project has the potential to correct gender disparities or significantly mainstream gender concerns, or is likely to have substantial gender impact, a detailed gender assessment needs to be undertaken during project design to prepare a project-specific gender plan. The gender plan is prepared during the design phase by a social development or gender specialist. A guide to key gender considerations in project design is provided in Appendix 2. Results of the gender analysis and a short summary of the gender plan are given in the report and recommendation of the President (RRP). The gender plan identifies strategies, mechanisms and/or project components for addressing gender concerns, and reports on how women are to be involved in the design, implementation and monitoring process. Budget provision for these components or design features must also be highlighted in the plan. A short summary of the gender plan is included as a core appendix to the RRP, consisting of (i) the preparatory work undertaken to address gender issues in the project; (ii) the special features included in the project design to address gender impacts, to facilitate and encourage women’s involvement and/or ensure tangible benefits to women; (iii) mechanisms to ensure implementation of the gender design elements; and (iv) gender monitoring and evaluation. A gender plan format is provided in Appendix 3. If there is a project-specific gender plan, the project team leader and project counsel ensure that the loan documents support the implementation and monitoring of the gender plan.[71]

  1. Unclear ‘Gender Strategy’

The income restoration program in the draft resettlement plan is need to be developed by consulting women and women’s groups. establishing women-centered income generation activities and involving NGOs, women’s groups, and other CBOs in income restoration planning and implementation. [72]

The draft RP has no clear gender strategy that was developed with the prior and informed consent of women. It does mention what special measures or assistance to be provided to women who will be directly affected by the project. We doubt if there these key issues were discussed at length, substantively and in aninformed and facilitated manner when there were socialization and gender public meetings on the RP of WTC Rehabilitation Project considering that they were only within three hours.[73] ADB’s Report cites these meetings as consultations in the Appendix 5: Consultation. This is unacceptable when doing analysis that assesses the special needs of women.

Lastly, the half page gender analysis in the draft RP is not representative of the needs of women and lacks rigor in assessing the differential project impacts to women, men and children. If this project gets executed without a substantially revised and publicly commented gender strategy, it creates and further risks of impoverishment and suffering of women especially those living in the embankment.


VII. Conclusion

It is loud and clear the the overall objective of the ICWRMIP Phase 1 projects can and is hardly met by the methodologies used based on the draft resettlement plan, relevant project safeguard documents and preparations.

The draft resettlement plan of the Phase 1 projects suffers from serious flaws. It does not have sound and clear mechanisms that ensure compliance with the IR Policy at the design and implementation stages. The lack of explicit, verifiable, monitorable, and workable gender, anti-corruption and integrated water management strategies pose serious risks in terms of sparking or reinforcing vertical and horizontal conflicts in the project area. The resettlement plan and other safeguard preparation activities in the Project 1 have no strong guarantee that directly affected people will be safeguarded. Risks to further impoverishment are high.

Specifically, the draft Resettlement Plan is deeply flawed because:

· The estimated number of project affected peoples (resettled and host) is inadequate.

· It does not have clear mechanism to address land scarcity and land acquisition issues.

· There are no proper compensation, livelihood restoration and rehabilitation assistance measures?

· It does not guarantee livelihood restoration to the affected people given the gaps in the assistance measures. The social preparation strategy is unclear and unacceptable.

· The resettlement processes have not been clear and participatory.

· The livelihood restoration program does not provide sufficient mechanism and assurance to meet the project objective.

· There is a wide gulf between the Project objective (which is to fill-in any gaps in what local laws and regulations cannot provide in order to help ensure that AHs are able to rehabilitate themselves to at least their pre-project condition)[74] and the design of the Livelihood Restoration Program. The LRP does appear to provide a guarantee affected persons will not be worse off when they have been resettled. given that the relocation site is unknown and the training programs are based on assumptions.

· Overall, the LRP is very patchy, sketchy, not comprehensive, and vague. It doesn’t have explicit objective and plan to improve or at least to restore their productive hood, including for the affected farmers who might not find their right for land-use.

Transparency and consultation practices are also problematic in the sense that there have been inadequate public information disclosure and consultations especially to the affected families and local governments.

It also very clear that the resettlement plan has no clear and sound gender strategy vis-à-vis ADB’s gender policy. The draft resettlement plan fails to address the mechanisms that oblige every project team leader and project counsel to address critical components of gender and development issues. If the project would continue without in-depth assessment of the differential needs and impacts of the project to women and regardless of the gender policy and IPSA, it could mean that rather than promoting sustainability, this project could further impoverishment risks to women who live at the embankment.

Risks are high in the project also because an anti-corruption framework – and how it will be operationalized – is not in place. It does not have clear mechanism to prevent and combat corrupt practices in the project management at the local and national levels.

There are legitimate and informed critiques on the application of IWRM approach in the ICWRMIP. It has no empirical evidence that demonstrates any successful IWRM projects in Indonesia or in SEA. Yet, it is pushing for this strategy without paying attention to the issue of transaction costs of allocation such that it is not inclusive of different parties from the upper and downstream (having their differential power and competing claims in water allocation and resources) in the project management and decision making. In Indonesia, there have been recent controversies surrounding the creation of a river basin water board whose mandate cuts across the municipal and provincial boundaries, because some local governments refuse to have their authority in river management (inc. charging and collecting user fees) delegated to a river basin board as this will affect their local revenues. The ICWRMIP has no clear strategy how to address such vertical and horizontal conflicts over Citarum river management.

The rehabilitation of West Tarum Canal project fails to address the growing problems of farmers’ declining access to Citarum water to irrigate their rice fields due to significant increase of water allocated for industrial and drinking consumptions.

What is more critical and necessary for the sustainability of ensuring water supply and equitable water allocation is the “rehabilitation” of the upstream Citarum and integrative planning and decision making that encompass the upstream and downstream stakeholders and communities, not the rehabilitation of West Tarum Canal.


VIII. Key message

Since ICWRMIP has no strong and broad community and stakeholder support and given that the high impoverishment and political risks outweigh the potential benefits (which remain unclear), at the maximum, the ADB Board should seriously consider pulling out from investing into the whole MFF-ICWRMIP unless a significant, meaningful and strongly and broadly supported re-assessment of the entire program is undertaken. If the Board proceeds with approving the whole MFF-ICWRMIP without such reassessment, it is a validation that they put legitimacy to the Program that clearly and seriously violates ADB’s safeguard policies and all relevant policies and operating procedures. We urgently demand, among others, that the ADB Board should immediately postpone the approval of the MFF-ICWRMIP and the Phase 1 projects on December 4, 2008 until significant improvements in the project and corrective measures that comply with the bank’s policies, best practices and international standards are in place. Critical project documents should be disclosed and subjected to informed, inclusive and multi-stakeholder consultations, to the direct and indirect affected people.

A more critical task now is not about the infusion of money but it is about ensuring proper, accountable and participatory governance of Citarum river water resources. We believe that this proposed program might result in incurring bad debt, burdening people with loans that do not help ensure their sustained access to Citarum river management resources. ICWRMIP is an initiative designed largely by technocrats that may obstruct local governments and people’s initiatives in managing their common resources.

-o0o-


[1] This report was prepared by Diana Gultom (debtWATCH Indonesia), Arimbi Heroepoetri (ELAW-Indonesia) and Hamong Santono (KruHA) with technical and editorial support from he Bank Information Center-SEA. Rezki Wibowo of Transparency International-Indonesia shared his analysis on the anti-corruption framework of ICWRMIP while Prof. Wijanto Hadipuro (PhD Candidate) affiliated with the Faculty of Economics and Masters Program on Environment and Urban Area Catholic University of Soegijapranata provided his comments on the integrated water resource management (IWRM) approach of the this proposed program. West Java groups of ARUM also provided their analysis and findings in their field reports.

[2] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INI, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 Agustus 2008, page 15, para 33

[3] According to ADB’s Environmental Assessment and Review Framework for the ICWRMP, 7 December 2006

[4] Many researches has been conducted throughout the years relating to the Citarum River Basin, including from the GoI, World Bank, and JBIC

[5] MFF uses a flexible framework that allows the ADB to fund, using prospective loans and guarantees, an agreed and a set of investment program coming out of a sector roadmap. ICWRMIP is the first MFF-type of lending program (facility) which includes multiple sub-projects, carried out in various phases over medium to long term, and includes physical investments, technical advice and capacity building. Financing will be carried out in tranches. MFF is a curious case of new funding modality since it has been beset with concerns including those from the Board, citing risks to implementation and accountability. See: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Board/Chairs-Summaries/2008/Chair-Summary-Mainstreaming-MFF.pdf

[6] For further info on MFF, see http://www.adb.org/projects/mff.asp

[9] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, Project Background, page iii

[10] In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg adopted IWRM as a key strategy to operationalise WSSD’s Plan of Implementatio, particularly in addressing water scarcity issues.

[12] Visit http://www.gdrc.org/uem/water/iwrm/slide-start.html to learn more about the ideas behind IWRM

[13] Asit K. Biswas, Past President IWRA, President, Third World Centre for Water Management, Atizapan, Mexico

[14] Saravanan.V.S., Geoffrey T. McDonald, Peter P. Mollinga, Critical Review of Integrated Water Resources Management: Moving Beyond Polarised Discourse, Bonn, 2008, page 4

[15] Ibid., page 9

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., page 12

[18] For the explanation of transaction costs please see World Bank’s Water Resources Management (1993).

[19] The discussion about it can be found in Erik Swyngedouw;s article Governance Innovation and the Citizen: the Janus Face of Governance-beyond-the-State in Urban Studies 42 (11), 2006.

[22] According to the Law No 7 of 2004 on water resources, the implementing regulation to establish water boards is the Presidential Decree. Until today the agreement achieved only covers the establishment of the national water board.

[23] Two of the influential private companies are PAM Jaya (Public Drinking Water Company in Jakarta where 51% of the shares are controlled by Suez Lyonaise) and Aetra (owned by Aquatico, a local investor; Aetra was formerly owned by Thames Water of RWE Germany). See: Wijanto Hadipuro, Study on the dynamics of Water Governance: Case study of Indonesian Jatiluhur Dam Water Allocation, 2008, page 1.

[24] According to Moch. Ichsan (a local parliamentarian from Bandung District), “hte central government has a regulation to force the region to be the guarantor of the central government’s debt which is used to finance development in that region.”

[25] LSM Tolak Penanganan Sungai Citarum Gunakan Dana Utang, http://newspaper.pikiran-rakyat.co.id/prprint.php?mib=beritadetail&id=22103 accessed on 10 July 2008, 7.25 PM

[26] ADB menetapakan 25 elemen kunci bagi pelaksanaan proyek-proyek Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), see: http://www.adb.org/water/wfp/basin-elements.asp

[27] FGD July 8, 2008. The venue was Hotel Karang Setra.

[29] Ibid. translated from previous footnote.

[31] The rehabilitation of West Tarum Canal project is the focus of this resettlement plan assessment.

[32] Handbook on Resettlement – A Guide to Good Practice, Asian Development Bank, 1998, page 3

[33] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page 20, Table 4.1 and paragraph 42

[34] According to the principles of ADB’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy, principle (iii) stated that “If individuals or a community must lose their land, means of livelihood, social support systems or way of life in order that a project might proceed, they should be compensated and assisted so that their economic and social future will generally be at least favorable with the project as without it”.

[35] Handbook on Resettlement – A Guide to Good Practice, Asian Development Bank, 1998, page 56

[36] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page 48, para 93

[37] ibid

[38] Ibid, page 57

[39] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page 75

[40] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page 20, table 4.1

[41] See ADB Involuntary Resettlement Policy, basic principles point (iv)

[42] Refer to Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page 48-51 on Livelihood Restoration Program

[43] Asian Development Bank, Handbook on Resettlement: A Guide to Good Practice (1998) page v

[44] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page iv, para S12

[45] Penghuni Kolong Tol Dapat Uang Kerohiman, http://m.infoanda.com/readnewsid.php, accessed on 11/14/2008 7:00 PM

[46] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page 21

[47] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page vii.

[48] Asian Development Bank, OM Section F2/BP Issued on 29 October 2003, page 3

[49] Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986. UNHCR, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm, Article 2 point 1.

[50] Sri Palupi, Problem dan Tantangan dalam Akses Hak Ekonomi, Sosial, Budaya, 9 July 2008 http://komnasham.go.id/portal/files/Sri%20Palupi_Problem%20dan%20Tantangan%20dalam%20Akses%20Hak%20Ekosob.doc accessed on 11/12/2008 5:31 PM

[51] http://sangguru.8m.com/custom3.html accessed on11/12/08 5:09 PM

[52] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, table 5.1.

[53] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page iv, para S12

[54] Meeting with National Planning Bureau (BAPPENAS), Jakarta, 14 July 2008 chaired by Donny Azdan, Director of Water and Irrigation Department BAPPENAS.

[55] http://sangguru.8m.com/custom3.html accessed on11/12/08 5:09 PM

[58] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, para 85-87.

[59] Asian Development Bank, Involuntary Resettlement Policy, page 16, para 52.

[60] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page iii, para S7.

[61] Pages 42 and 43 of ADB TA 4381-INO: Additional Survey and Consultation to the Affected People in Preparation for Resettlement Plan for the West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation. Technical Report for Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Project, 2007

[62]ADB Anti Corruption Policy, 1998, para 17.

[63] See, for instance, page 63, table 8.6 of the the Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008.

[64] Asian Development Bank, Public Communication Policy, March 2005.

[65] Asian Development Bank, Gender Policy ADB, page vii

[66] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, table 6.1., table 6.2., table 6.3.

[67] Jender dan Kemiskinan: Laporan Kunjungan Lapangan ke Tarum Kanal Barat, Arimbi Heroepoetri, ELAW Indonesia, November 2008.

[68] debtWATCH Indonesia, Temuan lapangan di Tarum Kanal Barat, Diana Gultom, November 2008.

[69] Asian Development Bank, Handbook on Resettlement: A Guide to Good Practice (1998) page 64 box 7.1

[70] OM Section C2/BP Issued on 25 September 2006 para 11

[71] Ibid. para 11-12

[72] Asian Development Bank, Handbook on Resettlement: A Guide to Good Practice (1998) page 66

[73] Resettlement Planning Document, 37049-01-03 INO, INO: Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program (West Tarum Canal Rehabilitation), 11 August 2008, page 75-76, Appendix 5.

[74] Ibid, page 15, para 33